Rapid “thaw” may open up “flooding”

Igor Botan / April 15, 2008

Voronin — Smirnov meeting

President Vladimir Voronin and Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov met in Bender on April 11, 2008, after a pause of six years and half. That was a sensational event. Judging after conduct, Smirnov would have liked to avoid that meeting, with the recognition of Transnistria’s independence by Russia being a priority for him. The Russian Federation, which fully controls the Smirnov regime, has constantly insisted that the Transnistrian conflict may be settled through negotiations only, with the participation of Transnistrian representatives as an equal party. As Moldova is preparing the March 2009 parliamentary elections, President Voronin had to breach his famous August 2004 statement that he would never meet “marionettes” again but “puppeteers” only in the conflict resolution process. The resumption of the negotiation process should be a direct result of the Voronin-Smirnov meeting.

Should Voronin continued refusing meetings with Smirnov, the latter would have speculated this refusal on background of Russia’s recent call for the “territorial integrity” of Moldova based on the statement that the “potential of the negotiation process is not yet used up.” That means that the further blocking of the negotiations would have fuelled speculations of the Transnistrian regime that Russia should recognise its independence in the “Kosovo precedent” context. In this regard, Smirnov has looked for excuses to avoid the meeting with Voronin, refusing to meet in the territory controlled by constitutional authorities. Instead, Voronin had to humiliate himself in front of who he called “bandit”, “criminal”, etc., in the past years and accept to go to Bender which is controlled by separatist forces. This detail reveals the side who was interested in this meeting the most.

However, Smirnov has also found a goal of the meeting with Voronin. He made this step after deriding what he described as fanciful statements released by Voronin in a March interview with the Moscow-based newspaper “Kommersant” regarding actions he was ready to take forward settling the Transnistrian conflict. Voronin said in that interview that he was ready to meet Smirnov in order to make a progress in resuming the negotiation process.

Smirnov has severely and clearly explained why he accepted to meet Voronin — to discuss the recognition of Transnistria’s independence. Indeed, Smirnov was obliged to meet instructions by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who told him “nado” (must) and to accept a telephone conversation with President Voronin and then the proper meeting. As he has stated after the April 7 telephone conversation, Smirnov accepted to meet Voronin in order to hand in “the friendship agreement between Transnsitria and the Republic of Moldova”; that means an agreement between two sovereign states.

More than that, the Transnistrian propaganda-making machine has held a mad campaign on background of the Voronin-Smirnov meeting in order to stress negative attitudes toward Moldova, noting that Voronin is not credible in eyes of the Tiraspol administration. The public opinion was recalled the March 2005 case of former defence minister; Voronin’s refusal to sign the Kozak Memorandum in 2003; the “economic blockade” introduced in 2006 on the background of recent unprecedented cases of trafficking in drugs in Moldova; other evidence that makes Transnistria unwilling anything in common with Moldova, so that it will regulate its relations through a “friendship agreement” only.

Following the meeting that lasted an hour and half, Voronin and Smirnov have shown themselves up in front of cameras to comment their talks. The two screwed faces were a very eloquent proof of reciprocal feelings of the two persons, as well as of the fact that the circumstances alone have pushed them to a private meeting. Smirnov seized the occasion to stress that Voronin was his guest in Bender and, given this quality, he generously allowed him to address journalists the first. Also, Smirnov noted that he has handed in the “friendship agreement” to Voronin and the “two equal parties” should sign and ratify this document as sovereign and independent states. Finally, Smirnov emphasised that he is expecting constitutional authorities of Moldova to ensure an equal-footing treatment; to withdraw all economic and commercial obstacles faced by Transnsitria. In spite of the manner in which Smirnov tried to lay the emphasis, President Voronin has ostentatiously avoided comments on Smirnov’s provocative initiatives, focussing on matters he was particularly interested in — actions to build confidence between the two banks of the Dniester River; that means measures directly recommended by his October 2007 initiatives.

The only yielding Voronin has reportedly accepted while meeting Smirnov was the promise to ask the European Union (EU) and the United States to withdraw the travel interdiction on 17 Transnistrian dignitaries, but in turn the Transnistrian side shall withdraw the travel ban against a number of Moldovan officials. Instead, Voronin has assured himself a significant support of participants in the “5+2” negotiation process. Thus, the EU special representative to Moldova, Kalman Mizei, has appreciated Voronin’s efforts and his meeting with Smirnov. Voronin’s meeting with Smirnov was synchronised with a meeting between U.S. and UK ambassador Michael Kirby and John Meyer and Transnistrian speaker Evgeni Shevchyuk, who discussed the possibility of implementing infrastructural projects recommended by Voronin’s October 2007 initiatives. Even more, the projects concerned are part of the National Development Strategy (NDS) for 2008–2011 and the programme of the new Greceanii Cabinet of Ministers.

All the facts above have been arranged so that to give the impression that Voronin’s meeting with Smirnov was necessary to restart a wide conflict settlement plan which is not ready yet, though this event was unpleasant for the president of Moldova.

Reiterated attitude of President Voronin towards Transnistrian problem

On April 3, 2008, just one week before the meeting with Smirnov, President Voronin reiterated Moldova’s stance on Transnistrian conflict at the Bucharest NATO Summit:

Moldova will do its best to capture the attention of the international community on the uncertain situation generated by the Transnistrian conflict, which produces instability and affects the regional security for more than 16 years. For this reason, the country is politically and territorially divided so far, with half a million Moldovan citizens being held hostages by a separatist regime;
The Transnistrian problem is fuelling the insecurity and instability potential in Moldova and the whole region. The Transnistrian conflict is halting the modernisation of the Republic of Moldova. The interference of the Transnistrian problem is observed in the undermining of the CFE Treaty, NATO enlargement, anti-rocket defence systems in Europe, Kosovo case;
Moldova’s formal stance regarding the Transnistrian conflict is to find a viable solution based on demilitarisation and restriction of foreign troops and military units in the national territory, accordingly to the recognised neutrality status of Moldova; to award a fair status to the Transnistrian region as part of a sovereign, indivisible and integral Moldova in territorial terms;
During the Transnistria settlement process Moldova will keep being devoted to its pro-European aspirations, very active involvement of all sides to recognise its constitutional neutrality and promotion of the reintegration of the country on the basis of international law (according to Moldpres).

By handing in the so-called “friendship agreement” to Voronin at the April 11 meeting, Smirnov wanted to stress his diametrically opposite point of view regarding the Transnistria settlement. Indeed, Smirnov’s “friendship agreement” is also a response to Voronin’s “October initiatives”. Voronin stressed after meeting Smirnov that no groundless yielding to the “separatist regime” is envisaged in the Transnistria settlement process and the process of searching a valid solution to the Transnistrian conflict in the “5+2” format does not stipulate the federalisation of Moldova.

Reactions to Voronin-Smirnov meeting

The Chisinau media has controversially commented the Voronin-Smirnov meeting. As a rule, the media affiliated to the ruling party has praised the courage of the chief of state. On the other hand, the independent media and that supporting the opposition said that:

President Voronin did not resist to pressures, being forced to meet Smirnov and accept to be humiliated and defeated by Russia and its “marionettes” from Transnsitria;
By accepting to meet Smirnov, President Voronin put Moldova to the danger of Transnistrisation;
The things will return again to sterile negotiations after the Voronin-Smirnov meeting, it means the situation of 10 or 7 years ago when Voronin succeeded to the governance and promised a rapid conflict resolution;
By making the game of Putin in Transnistria, Voronin is turning Moldova into an enclave located in Ukraine’s ribs, in order to undermine the Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine;
EU, USA and OSCE diplomats and representatives who welcomed the Voronin-Smirnov meeting were unable to understand the stratagems and tricks of the Russian diplomacy;
After all, Voronin was categorically defeated by Moscow and Tiraspol with a huge score gap.

The viewpoints above underline the opposition’s logic that President Voronin is wrongly approaching the Transnistrian problem in terms of principle. A number of opposition parties and local experts consider that the right solution for Moldova is to make a common front with Georgia and Ukraine in favour of a pro-NATO application, rather than to insist on Moldova’s neutrality. According to a part of opposition focussing on neutrality idea is a condition imposed by Russia and it reflects the Russian interests. It is supposed that ceding to Russia with regard to the neutrality problem just opens up the “Pandora’s box”. In this respect, President Voronin is accused of promoting obscure interests and non-transparent negotiations.

It is worth to mention that the viewpoints above make abstraction of the new context, which is absolutely unlike the one in which the Voronin-Smirnov meeting took place:

The recognition of Kosovo’s independence by key western states has provided Russia with the opportunity to act the same way regarding separatist enclaves in CIS. Moldovan authorities really feared that Russia will act the same way. But Russia refrained from “play the ape” and mimicry the West despite threats to regard the Kosovo precedent as universal. Even more, the State Duma has released a declaration after hearings, confirming the recognition of Moldova’s territorial integrity. There are profound reasons for such a conduct and they shall be understood. In these circumstances, it shall be clearly distinguished what is the best for Moldova — to resume negotiations even at the cost of the humiliating meeting of Voronin with Smirnov or let the things develop at random;
The restart of negotiations in 2008 is not equivalent to the resumption of the status quo antes 2001 simply because the negotiations will develop now on background of the control on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border and EUBAM Mission. Minister of Reintegration Vasile Sova had to withdraw from negotiations in February 2006 in order to avoid explanations linked to the introduction of the border control on March 3, but Tiraspol replied by blocking the resumption of negotiations and thus this process has been blocked for more than two years. The resolution of the conflict outside the negotiation process is categorically excluded by Russia, which fully controls the Transnistrian region. Therefore, the resumption of negotiations after the Voronin-Smirnov meeting means the return to the same point, but in a more advantageous context for Moldova;
Should the negotiations restart after the Voronin-Smirnov meeting, they would be held in the context of Ukraine’s supported efforts to join Euro-Atlantic organisations. Ukraine was promised at the NATO Summit in Bucharest to be invited to sign a NATO pre-accession plan at the ministerial summit after half a year. Even more, President Viktor Yushchenko told the 5th World Movement for Democracy Meeting in Kiev on April 6–9, 2008 that France’s president has promised him to consider the possibility of offering an EU association agreement to Ukraine by next autumn, in order to balance the effect of the postponed offer to sign a NATO pre-accession plan.

Transnistria — Russia’s handle-free suitcase?

Separatist elites in Tiraspol were also very unsatisfied with Russia’s behaviour. But being fully dependent on Moscow’s benevolence, they had to accept the new conjuncture. The Transnistrian leaders are demoralised because they have been encouraged in the past three years to hold propagandistic campaigns round o’clock to assure citizens that Russia will use the “universality of the Kosovo precedent” in order to recognise Transnistria’s independence, while now they have to look for a compromise solution with the Republic of Moldova.

The March hearings and Declaration by the Russian State Duma concerning the unrecognised republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria revealed that Russia’s threats to treat the “Kosovo case” as a universal precedent was a banal bluffness. In this regard, a number of Transnistrian lawmakers had to accuse Russia of unwillingness to honour its promises and to blame it for sufferings of Transnistrians, who have to live in an extremely bad material condition and face shortages because of the pro-Russia orientation which proves to be sterile.

These attitudes emerged into a first political scandal between members of the separatist “old guard” in Tiraspol, who started searching those to blame for Moscow’s new attitude towards the separatist enclave. The Supreme Soviet has even accused foreign minister Valeri Litskai of professional incapacity. Trying to defend himself, Litskai had to recall everybody Russia’s inflexible stance to settle the Transnistrian conflict on the basis of Moldova’s territorial integrity and by granting a guaranteed status to Transnistria. He indicated confederative relations between Moldova and Transnistria, hinting that a federative solution would be the best one. The “solution” recommended by Litskai seems to be intermediary between those publicly promoted by Voronin and Smirnov.

However, Russia’s conduct has profound explanations. Russian experts tried to argue why Russia had to act contrarily to own threats to regard the “Kosovo case” as a universal precedent:

Russia did not have any real lever to influence the situation after the withdrawal of its troops from Pristina in 2003. By resisting to solutions of the United States and key EU member states, Russia had no way but calling for the “respect for the law”. After Kosovo’s independence was declared and a number of states recognised it, Russia’s dilemma was either to “mimic” and resort to the “universality of the Kosovo precedent” or to set itself up for being “a cogent defender of the international law.” But this dilemma did not exist in reality;
Russia was destined to choose “the respect for the international law” and not to meet the expectations of the CIS separatist enclaves to recognise their independence, though it has constantly fuelled them starting 2005. The problem seems to be that “Kosovo case” in particular and the Serbia’s in general will become soon an “internal problem” of the EU, which “lures” them with the promise to let them join the bloc. Their separate reformation, and modernisation may be achieved faster than if keeping them together with an uncertain status;
Should Russia recognise the separatist enclaves in CIS as a reaction to the “Kosovo case”, this would definitively undermine the already semi-dead structure CIS. The CIS is not as attractive as the EU is. Eventual problems emerged from recognition of the separatist enclaves in CIS would antagonise Russia’s relations both with GUAM members and with Kazakhstan and Belarus, which would feel themselves threatened by such a conduct. Unlike the EU, Russia cannot offer anything instead of recognition of the separatist enclaves to keep them on the waterline. After the “monetisation of relations” with the CIS, Russia’s only lever is to threaten with embargoes;
The Bucharest NATO Summit has revealed that the declared intentions of Kiev and Tbilisi to receive NATO pre-accession plans have brought them many problems, as well as supplementary opportunities in relations with Russia. The manoeuvre field of Washington ad Brussels has been enlarged. By temporarily ceding to Russia with regard to pre-accession plans for Georgia and Ukraine, the NATO has strengthened its positions concerning the anti-rocket shield problem. Georgia may play on the edge: the accession to NATO vs. non-recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia. Russia’s threats regarding Ukraine’s Crimea help consolidating the political class and bring new arguments in favour of the Euro-Atlantic vector. The contrast of the effects of accession of Central and East European countries to NATO and EU with the effects of status of Belarus and Armenia as Russia’s main allies is striking, encouraging the support for the Euro-Atlantic course;
The Republic of Moldova is trying to harvest benefits from the new conjuncture created by others. President Voronin wants probably to seize this situation via the package of initiatives he has proposed to Russia, which seems to be generally backed by the EU and U.S. In these circumstances, Russia also wants to profit of Chisinau’s obedience in order to produce the least a positive event in the CIS area — to propose an “anti-Kosovo” solution which would confirm its claim of “defender of the international law”, but without running any risk to lose the influence in the region.

Conclusions

In the context of the new regional conjuncture President Vladimir Voronin got a positive rather than negative score after the April 11, 2008 meeting. It is hard to underrate the weight of the propagandistic victory of the ruling party a year before the 2009 parliamentary elections. Voronin has actually received a green light to his October 2007 initiative on building confidence between the two banks of the Dniester. The creation of working groups and high probability to resume the “5+2” negotiation process is a proof in this respect. The support of U.S., EU and OSCE representatives for Voronin’s initiatives and financial assistance promises additionally confirm a positive trend;
As regards Moldova’s long-term interests, those raising prudence over President Voronin’s recent performance are true. The ostentatious differentiation that Russia is making between the separatist enclave of Moldova and those of Georgia has a price that Moldova has started paying in advance. In particular, Moldovan authorities kept silence when Russia held elections for the State Duma in Transnistria like at home on March 2. Now it is to see whether Moldovan authorities will tacitly allow Russia to open representations in separatist enclaves, accordingly to the recent Declaration by the State Duma. This process is underway in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia has immediately and vehemently reacted like at the March 2 elections, seeking international support;
Moldova’s dissociation with GUAM states — Ukraine and Georgia — regarding relations with NATO advantages it somehow in Russia’s attitudes towards the Transnistrian conflict, though this is not the most genuine step by Moldovan authorities. But undermining Ukraine’s positions as regional leader and key pivot of GUAM through Moldova’s eventual withdrawal from this organisation, the way President Voronin has recently announced, is hardly a correct step. Ukraine’s role in settling the Transnistrian conflict is as important as the one of Russia. Ukraine’s advancement forward EU and NATO is the only and most real guarantee for Moldova to recover Transnistria. In this respect, President Voronin’s insistence on internationally “recognised neutrality status” of Moldova raises confusion. By recognising the sovereignty of Moldova, states of the world recognise automatically the constitutional norm on its neutrality. In all likelihood, President Voronin wants the own country to be unable to modify the article concerned from Constitution in future, without the consent of countries which would “recognise its neutrality status.” This gives arguments to the opposition to fear that President Voronin wants indeed to limit the sovereignty of the country and turn it into a kind of international protectorate.
Moldovan authorities should not cherish illusions regarding possibility to quickly settle the Transnistrian conflict. Russian influent circles have made public scenarios of likeliest evolutions of Russia’s relations with separatist enclaves. Two scenarios that complete each other could be implemented in parallel, making reference to the U.S. relations with Taiwan and Puerto Rico. It means that relations would be constantly developed on the basis of the “Taiwan example” and Russia would treat the separatist enclaves as de facto independent states. Referenda on association of separatist enclaves with Russia would be periodically recommended in parallel, on the basis of the association of Puerto-Rico with the U.S. Thus, conditions for the slowly “digestion” of the separatist enclaves by Russia would be created by adjusting all aspects of their internal life to Russian norms. Both approaches exclude the need of recognising the independence of the separatist enclaves, allowing Russia to set itself up for being a “firm protector of the international law,” as well as to maintain states suffering from separatism in its area of influence. This suits Russia very well, being able to treat the separatist enclaves the way it wants — either as de facto but unrecognised states, “contributing to the resolution of conflicts with constitutional authorities of Moldova and Georgia” or as associated entities populated by “fellow countrymen”, citizens of the Russian Federation. In fact, Russia has built relations with the separatist enclaves on basis of the “Taiwan model” since 1992, while the strategy on association with Russia after the Puerto-Rico model was elaborated by Constantin Zatulin in 2000 and it stipulated the massive awarding of the Russian citizenship to residents of separatist enclaves and referenda on association with Russia held in 2006 in all three separatist enclaves. The “Kosovo case” had no connection with those strategies. Now it is simply used for reasons of easiness to argue Russia’s policies on separatist regimes and emphasise the respect for the “international law.”
Given the circumstances above, resuming the “5+2” negotiation process is welcome before the 2009 elections but further actions are not recommended, as solutions to Transnistria’s status should be found after elections, when the pressure of rapid and negative solutions will be remedied. In metaphorical terms, the rapid “thaw” of the Transnistrian “frozen conflict” may open up “flooding” of all Moldova. In this regard, preventing risks of an eventual “transnistrisation” of Moldova is a priority.

The Action Plan is dead. Long live the Plan!	Things go wrong…