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Denouement: normality vs. boycott and revenge
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Instability will turn into incertitude
The denouement will take place on December 7. The political race between power and opposition will turn into normality, shall the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) unlock the election of chief of state. Otherwise, the revenging confrontation will follow the boycott. There will be the stake of early parliamentary elections — eliminating each other to periphery of political life. In consequence, all energies of political class will be wasted on preparations for the postponed clash next year. PCRM is almost incapable to reply with a categorical score, and even worse, it runs the risk to collapse. But its strategists know well that the likeliness of AIE splitting should not be neglected and this would be the only chance of PCRM to regain the rule in one or another formula; that means the things should be pushed to this direction.
Calculations and actions of PCRM seem to be simple — organising deadlocks, media assaults and boycotts that means provoking AIE on different dimensions, in effort to reveal at all costs the incompatible nature of AIE competences. In a predictable manner the algorithmic government should produce deadlocks right in the moment when coherent, prompt and discouraging reactions for malefic agents will be needed. This is a relatively feasible calculation, as one could observe that replying messages and reactions of AIE leaders aimed at narrow party interest and care for own electors, rather than at general interest of AIE. In this regard, AIE looks like a four-flat residential block, with residents sharing just the stairs in full disorder, as common to Moldovan realities.
Of course, facing the intransigent conduct of PCRM, AIE succeeded to prove its capacity to resist somehow, demonstrating certain discipline in making decisions and attracting international support. But nothing could be said about efficiency of AIE, though as already said, the heterogeneity of the Government established algorithmically does not promise any encouragement. For these reasons, the eventual dive of AIE into temporariness makes PCRM leaders hope that AIE will split anyway, and its components will clash and accuse each other for many sins.
A thing that AIE failed but still could do is to prove its capacity of taking coherent actions and having conduct strategies, both in case of unlocking the election of chief of state on December 7 in general and in case of a boycott emerging into early parliamentary elections in particular. Before the definitive normalisation of political situation, interventions in legislation should strictly target at removing barriers and deadlocks. The example of how AIE members realise constitutional changes is the best indicator of the lack of perspicacity. Drafting a new constitution in a society segmented antagonistically on diverse criteria and inflamed with lots of crises is equivalent to doing something that nobody would like, as it is well-known that “who wants everything immediately will get nothing in rates.”
Prior to the December 7 elections one may note that AIE has failed in terms of public communication with people in general and PCRM in particular. Although PCRM did its best to raise the stakes of political game till the last moment, AIE failed to persuade that the boycott and thirst of revenge will reduce the normality of communist parties from CIS. The stake on stings and threats to reveal “the skeletons in the closet” of PCRM did not have any impact in fact. Instead, the positive offer of AIE to PCRM was uncoordinated and late.
Offer vs. exposure of “skeletons in the closet” of PCRM
Objectively, Marian Lupu is the best candidate to head the state. The least surveys indicate this conclusion. In this respect, the AIE decision to nominate him candidate to this office is right and gives birth to political profit. If eventually PCRM boycotts the December 7 elections, it will have to afford consequences for barring the election of a candidate wanted by majority of population, as the Moldovan electorate supports those regarded as victims of injustice. Even more, as candidate to the presidential seat, Marian Lupu proved an inedited behaviour for political realities in the Republic of Moldova. On one hand, he settled his political accounts in advance as regards relations with AIE partners by voting along with the faction representing his Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) to elect alliance partners as Parliament head and prime minister. Marian Lupu chose the quality of expecting candidate for himself. Now AIE partners should settle their accounts for vindication, regardless of their displayed discontentment, making PCRM happy this way, as the latter could self-assure that the eventual splitting of AIE is not groundless.
On the other hand, Marian Lupu made an offer to PCRM, which the latter could not turn down in principle. In fact, it does not contain anything new. Except for the commitment to promote a law that would explain the right of the opposition, all other facts are already sanctioned by Constitution and laws of Moldova: respect for the right of the parliamentary opposition to appoint the leadership of the Chamber of Auditors and Central Electoral Commission; promotion of some socially-oriented economic policies; respect for constitutional regulations and maintenance of neutrality status; implementation of the country reintegration policy by respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova; ensuring the rights of all ethnic minorities, assuring conditions for their active participation in the public life of the country; strengthening local democracy; combating persecution of economic agents based on sympathy or political affiliation; organising the public broadcasting sector in the spirit of minimising the political influence; de-ideologising the education system and fairly approaching the history teaching issue; promoting political dialogue and compromise, combating intolerance manifestations; promoting policies aimed to strengthen the statehood of the Republic of Moldova, combating irredentist phenomena capable to undermine the sovereignty of the country.
However, this offer has a multiple valence. First, Marian Lupu confirms his attachment to values of the state based on the rule of law, excluding volunteerism and arbitrary enforcement of legal norms for interest of authorities, actions formerly practiced by the PCRM leadership, and this fact is worth of being mentioned. Second, he confirms his attachment to some principles which he respected while being PCRM member as well. Finally, the offer of Marian Lupu targets at dissipating phobias of electors, which have been cultivated and spread by PCRM over years, culminating with campaigns such as “let’s defend our Homeland” or let’s keep a close look-out for “keeping Moldova on the world map”. Now it does not matter any longer if the invoked dangers are real or imaginary, it matters that they had and still have the effect of maintaining the division of society on ethnic, linguistic, political, etc. criteria. In this respect, the offer of Marian Lupu is aimed to get rid of political cleavages from social-political life in the Republic of Moldova.
From other perspective, AIE pressures against PCRM to make the leadership of the latter to unlock the election of chief of state are somehow awkward. Unquestionably, the investigation of the April 7 events, inquiry of alleged fraudulent schemas of monopolisation of food imports by PCRM leaders, discovery of the so-called secret decisions with a corrupt potential of the former Greceanii government etc. may have an impact on the PCRM behaviour. But this would have an impact just in case of cogent evidence to indicate the prospect of successfully achieving these investigations. Situations when pressures against PCRM recall a banal blackmail on gulls cannot do anything but damage. In this regard, threats of some organisations or supporters of AIE to ban the communist symbols or reveal the “skeletons in the closet” — horrible secrets about involvement of PCRM leaders in weapon sales and doubtful privatisations — are counterproductive. They cannot be accomplished and proved, building just a negative background and encouraging clashes.
Mined ground the PCRM runs the risk to go to
Given the conditions above, the PCRM is due to make a decision regarding participation or boycott of the December 7 election. The decision to participate increases chances much, but does not guarantee the election of chief of state, while the decision to boycott does not guarantee the non-election of president. Choosing to take part in election would mean that the PCRM may nominate own candidate or allow faction members to attend the voting upon free consent, without appointing any candidate. Definitively, PCRM could appoint a certain group of members to participate in election. The decision to boycott would split the faction and would bring a chain reaction at level of party structures. The successful boycott would make PCRM support the consequences of being guilty for challenging early elections just in the event the AIE will keep being strong. In consequence, the “conciliating wing” of PCRM should determine itself in terms of “unity of ranges” and participation in boycott.
Conditions of holding early elections after a year are absolutely unpredictable, but they could not be best for PCRM. In ideological, programmatic and optional terms, an important electoral segment (pro-Russia supporters and retirees) which traditionally supports the PCRM could change its mind. In addition, PCRM has lost the tools of raising electoral “supra-profit”: quasi-monopoly on broadcasting; administrative resources and implicitly the former unlimited access to funds provided by domestic business under administrative pressure or for protectionism reasons. In consequence, the mined ground the PCRM would go to in case of early parliamentary elections next year would look like this:
- The adoption of a new PCRM programme in 2008 meant giving up the idea of building the socialism and communism foreseen by the precedent programme, which means turning the PCRM into an ordinary bourgeois party. Now the PCRM differentiates little with respect to other parties in terms of political and electoral offers. From this perspective, the PCRM will unlikely improve its electoral rating by promising to build a post-industrial society the next 30 years. On the contrary, it became clear during and after the April 7, 2009 developments that PCRM does not care of representing interests of “knowledge proletariat”;
- The attempt to regain the electorate which leaves for PDM by speculating that Marian Lupu betrayed the PCRM could worsen the condition of the party. It is easy to prove that the PCRM leadership has actually betrayed the communist principles at the October 2003 party conference. And then reconfirmed the betrayal definitively by declaring the liberal revolution in April 2007. One cannot forget the action taken by PCRM leadership to justify itself, inviting Moscow-based economist Mikhail Delyagin to make public improvisations regarding the Moldovan miracle — invention of liberal communism. The PCRM cause fails if at least a segment of the PCRM electorate believes that holding a distinct, social-democratic identity and making a coalition with liberals is more honourable than converting into liberal communist. In general, it would be cool if PCRM voters attended public debates on the topic: what is better to betray the party which betrayed its principles or to give away the principles and party leader;
- Speculating the Romanian danger in effort to maintain the splitting of society, as well as speculating the uncommon alliance between unionist liberals and statehood-supporting social-democrats cannot have the expected effect after it was proved that the loss of governing by PCRM did not “delete Moldova from the world map.” On the contrary, the alliance of social democrats and liberals is a proof that the effects of divided society challenged by PCRM may be remedied and removed when politicians with different visions cooperate and look for compromise solutions, agree on future bids;
- The stake of PCRM on keeping massive support of pro-Russia electorate from Moldova is illusory. Signals from the Russian Establishment advantage Marian Lupu more than Vladimir Voronin, and this fact was understood during the CIS summit in Chisinau, when President Dmitri Medvedev chose to meet his potential counterpart Marian Lupu, not his former counterpart Vladimir Voronin. In addition, Marian Lupu and his party PDM entered the international circuit at level of cooperation with the Russian ruling party “Yedinaya Rossia” and European socialists, represented 25 percent in the European Parliament. At the same time, PCRM still has Zyuganov’s party as partner in Russia and the united left in the European Parliament, which represents 5 percent together with the northern greens. The pro-Russia electorate from Moldova will unlikely be insensitive to new circumstances occurred in the last half a year;
- The invocation of danger to give up the neutrality and accept eventual accession of the Republic of Moldova to NATO is not credible. The PCRM leader may be introduced as greatest Euro-Atlantic supporter from Moldova in eyes of pro-Russia electorate. Under the rule of Vladimir Voronin, who set himself up in 2001 as fighter against “world and American imperialism,” Moldova signed IPAP in 2006 and organised military exercises in the country with the participation of NATO. This strategic step was preceded by deployment of Moldovan bomb experts to Iraq in 2004 to assist U.S. military. This was an excellent action and respect for Moldovan military for the exemplary service, but how does PCRM dare to reset itself up as defender of interests of Russia, which “will not accept the passing of NATO tanks to Briansk?” In general, the PCRM rhetoric about betrayal may reveal that the PCRM leader is a multiple traitor in eyes of pro-Russia electorate: he betrayed Vladimir Putin when he asked him to work out a Transnistrian settlement project (Kozak Memorandum) and further refused to sign the document while Putin was already on way to Chisinau to attend the ceremony; he betrayed Russia’s interests when he proposed the reanimation of GUAM and organised on April 22, 2005 the summit to revive this organisation, which Russia regards as hostile to its interests. And these betrayals were not free of charge. They have been paid for — votive Euro-Atlantic supporters Traian Basescu, Mihail Saakashvili and Viktor Yushchenko persuaded the “anti-communist” opposition to elect Vladimir Voronin as chief of state, an action ended with the “April 4 betrayal”. Now the PCRM leader avoids making a display of his friendship with the orange trio from 2005, while the PCRM-affiliated media makes bubbles regarding alleged scenarios of “orange revolutions” targeted against PCRM. Well, how could one use against PCRM leader something that the latter enjoyed the most? That’s why on December 7 the PCRM should settle its accounts for the “April 4 betrayal”.
Given the facts above, it seems obvious that the lack of strong evidence, use of ideological eclecticism to justify conjuncture interests, oscillating foreign policy and dishonoured manifestations could not bring internal and external sympathy to PCRM. For these reasons, the best solution for this party in particular and Republic of Moldova in general would be to unlock the presidential elections and focus on a deep reformation.